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ACCELERATING INTEGRATION:
EFFECTIVE REMEDIES IN PUBLIC
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION SUITS
Adam M. Shayne*
The current state of lower income housing' in the United
States is one of the most pressing concerns confronting our
country. This nation's future progress and prosperity hinge upon
whether it will commit sufficient resources to supply adequate
shelter for lower income individuals and families on a nondis-
criminatory, low-density basis. Integrated public housing would
make great strides toward resolving a number of serious domes-
tic problems that arise from the current concentration of subsi-
dized housing units in minority neighborhoods.
The increasingly visible rate of homelessness turns, to some
extent, upon the lack of housing units available to those of little
or no means. Between 1985 and 1987, the number of persons ap-
plying for emergency shelter increased at an average of twenty-
two percent each year.2 Approximately 735,000 people across the
nation are homeless on any given night, and this problem no
longer afflicts only individuals.3 Entire families live without per-
manent shelter, including approximately 100,000 children.4 A
strong commitment to affordable housing would allow many
homeless persons to obtain adequate shelter for themselves and
their families.
The nation's drive towards integrated public schools could
gain strength if integrated housing reduced the need for more
problematic solutions such as busing.5 Courts have recognized
* Note Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 23, 1990.
B.A., Yale University, 1987; J.D., University of Michigan, 1990.
1. The 1981 amendment to the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
substituted references to "lower income" for all references to "low income." Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, 402 (1970) (amending
42 U.S.C. §§ 1437, 1437b-d, 1437f-j). This Note will follow the amended language of the
Act.
2. Tolchin, Mayors Hopeful on Homeless, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1989, at A7, col. 1.
3. See, e.g., Spolar, No Home-and Not Much Hope, Washington Post Nat'l Weekly
Ed., March 27, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
4. Id.
5. See generally P. DIMOND, BEYOND BUSING (1988) (examining desegregation cases of
the 1970s).
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that "[i]t would be illogical indeed to maintain that neighbor-
hood schools do not reflect the racial composition of the neigh-
borhoods from which they draw their pupils."'6 Residential segre-
gation lies at the core of the inability of school boards to
integrate public schools. Equalizing educational opportunities
requires the integration of both public schools and public
housing.
Finally, the problems of high-concentration public housing are
graphically illustrated in larger cities by the prevalence of gangs
that terrorize many of the housing projects. Drug use, crime, and
vandalism are rampant.7 Children living in the projects are
drawn or forced into gangs and illegal activities at young ages.'
Tenants of these projects are also much more likely to be the
victims of crime than are other members of society.' In a Phila-
delphia public housing discrimination suit, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit noted that concentrating lower income
housing affected not only those buildings' tenants, but also "oc-
cupants of owner occupied dwellings, merchants, and institu-
tions in the neighborhood." 10 Such concentration, the court
stated, "is thus prima facie at variance with the national housing
policy.""
Despite this array of problems, local housing authorities and
the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) continue to lag in constructing or rehabilitating public
housing in scattered sites throughout nonminority neighbor-
hoods. Plagued by recent scandals,'" HUD officials have cut
agency programs in an apparent effort to increase accountabil-
6. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester Hous. Auth., 458 Pa. 67, 86,
327 A.2d 335, 345 (1974). See also Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S.
990, 994 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("The principal cause of racial and ethnic imbal-
ance in urban public schools across the country-North and South-is the imbalance in
residential patterns.").
7. See, e.g., McKinley, Constant Reality in a Project: Fear of Violent Drug Gangs,
N.Y. Times, May 15, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (reporting drug dealing and warring drug fac-
tions in public housing projects in Bronx, New York); Schmidt, Bold Plans for Curing
Sick Housing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1988, at AS, col. 1 (describing the problems of drugs,
crime, and gangs in Chicago housing projects and efforts to clean up the buildings).
8. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1987, at 1, col. I (noting that gangs recruit young
children to run errands in Chicago public housing complexes).
9. Schmidt, supra note 7.
10. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 820 (3d Cir. 1970).
11. Id. at 821.
12. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June .17, 1989, at A22, col. 1 (editorial summarizing three
major HUD scandals that came out of the administration of Samuel A. Pierce, who
served as Secretary of HUD under President Reagan from 1981-88).
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ity.'3 Local city councils have also frustrated the progress of in-
tegrated public housing by refusing to approve proposed sites
located in predominantly white neighborhoods.14 In many cities,
the courts have played the most active role in insisting upon
nondiscriminatory public housing. 5 Although limited by their
roles as members of the judiciary, judges have used a variety of
remedies to coerce administrative and legislative bodies into
augmenting the current supply of public housing in a manner
that will lead to integrated residential neighborhoods.
This Note examines the different remedies employed by
judges to integrate public housing and recommends a standard
approach for courts to employ in the future. Part I describes the
status of local and federal public housing policy in the United
States. Part II examines litigation aimed at achieving the inte-
gration of public housing. This Part details short-term remedies
employed by judges in several cities and long-term integration
efforts by the courts in two cities: Chicago, Illinois, and Yonkers,
New York. The Chicago and Yonkers suits exemplify the major
obstacles that plaintiffs and judges face in developing appropri-
ate measures to integrate housing. Next, Part III discusses the
general problems inherent in housing remedies and suggests
three principles to guide judges in devising their orders. Drawing
upon these principles, it then analyzes the array of alternatives
employed by the courts and measures the effectiveness of these
remedies. Finally, Part IV concludes this Note by proposing a
standard set of orders that should successfully implement scat-
tered-site housing programs without extended periods of delay.
I. FEDERAL AND LOCAL HOUSING POLICY: SEGREGATION AND
CONCENTRATION
Congress passed legislation marking the first major attempt to
construct lower income public housing in 1937." Public housing
in the United States has, since that time, faced two principal
problems: segregation and concentration. In the past, local offi-
cials, with HUD funding, built public housing projects to ensure
13. See, e.g., May, Kemp Suspends Housing Program and Plans Overhaul of Others,
N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (describing Secretary of HUD Jack Kemp's sus-
pension of three housing programs due to fraud and mismanagement).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
15. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
16. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937).
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a complete segregation of whites and blacks.17 Housing authori-
ties discriminated in their tenant selection process by placing el-
igible blacks only in public housing units located in already
black neighborhoods."' In addition, these units were generally lo-
cated in large, high-rise apartments that contained exclusively
lower income families. This concentration of lower income resi-
dents has led to serious problems within public housing com-
plexes and the neighborhoods in which they are located. 9 Un-
fortunately, both local and federal governments have been
painfully slow in realizing the dramatic adverse social costs that
accrue from concentrating public housing in lower income
neighborhoods.
Since the 1970s, HUD regulations have insisted that new con-
struction sites "avoid undue concentration of assisted persons in
areas containing a high proportion of low-income persons."20 In
addition, a site is unacceptable if it is located in an area of mi-
nority race concentration;2' however, cost considerations are
often a barrier to sites in other neighborhoods.22 HUD permits a
waiver of its site requirements to meet "overriding housing
needs" or if a sufficient number of units are available "outside
areas of minority concentration. ' 23 The first exception, ironi-
cally, describes most large cities. The second exception, unfortu-
nately, describes none. 24 Thus, HUD has consistently approved
construction of projects in minority neighborhoods because of
the pressing need for housing and the lack of "feasible ' 25 alter-
native sites.
Even in those rare instances in which HUD does seek to en-
courage the construction of integrated public housing units, local
housing officials usually manage to frustrate the federal agency's
17. See, e.g., P. DIMOND, supra note 5, at 206-08 (detailing evidence offered by plain-
tiffs in Gautreaux litigation, see infra Part II.B.1, that documented purposeful discrimi-
nation by local housing officials, aldermen, and the mayor of Chicago); Farley, The Resi-
dential Segregation of Blacks from Whites: Trends, Causes, and Consequences, in
ISSUES IN HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 16, (U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights ed. 1985) (noting
that regulations requiring residential segregation in federally funded housing were finally
removed during President Kennedy's administration).
18. See, e.g., P. DIMOND, supra note 5, at 206-08.
19. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
20. 24 C.F.R. § 880.206(d) (1989).
21. Id. § 880.206(c)(1).
22. Peel, Pickett & Buehl, Racial Discrimination in Public Housing Site Selection,
in HOUSING, 1970-71 at 322, 362 (G. Sternlieb & L. Sagalyn ed. 1972).
23. 24 C.F.R. § 880.206(c)(1).
24. See generally Farley, supra note 17, at 17-21.
25. "Feasible" here refers to sites in nonminority neighborhoods that are within
HUD's tight cost restrictions.
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efforts.26 The United States Housing Act "vest[s] in local public
housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the
administration of their housing programs. '"27 In the past, inabil-
ity to obtain proper zoning or approval from local officials trig-
gered a waiver of HUD's site standards mandating integration.2 8
As three authors noted in their 1970 article on discriminatory
site selection, "[c]ost, zoning, and local political review-the
same factors that lie at the heart of the system of constraints
facing all LHA's [local housing authorities]-are singled out by
HUD regulation as satisfactory excuses for an LHA's failure to
achieve nondiscriminatory site selection." '29 Thus, municipal and
federal officials together have managed to deny thousands of eli-
gible tenants integrated public housing.
Nevertheless, there is a solution to the problems of public
housing: scattered-site housing. Scattered-site housing programs
limit the number of public housing units in any one area, and
particularly in any one structure. The programs seek to integrate
residential areas by restricting the amount of lower income
housing placed in neighborhoods with a large percentage of resi-
dents who belong to minority groups.3 0 In several communities
across the country, scattered-site programs, both mandatory and
voluntary, are responsible for successfully providing safe, inte-
grated housing to lower income tenants. 31 Although HUD has
provided neither the political will nor sufficient funding to insti-
tute these programs, plaintiffs and judges in public housing dis-
crimination suits have begun to insist on their implementation
in cities found responsible for intentional residential segregation.
II. THE DIFFICULTIES OF PUBLIC HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
LITIGATION: SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM REMEDIES
Legal challenges to public housing discrimination in the 1940s
resulted in a number of courts upholding the right of states to
26. Peel, Pickett & Buehl, supra note 22, at 362.
27. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437 (West Supp. 1989).
28. Peel, Pickett & Buehl, supra note 22, at 362.
29. Id.
30. See Stevens, Scattered Low-Cost Housing Offers Renewed Hope to Poor and Mi-
norities, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1988, at All, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
31. See Stevens, supra note 30 (describing a program in Montgomery County, Mary-
land, that "requires builders of housing developments to dedicate 12 percent of the
dwellings for the use of families with low and moderate income").
WINTER 1990]
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operate housing on a separate-but-equal basis.3 s In the next dec-
ade, however, some courts began to rule that intentional segrega-
tion by governmental bodies was constitutionally impermissi-
ble."s The Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of
Education,3 4 rejecting the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy
v. Ferguson,8 clearly applied to public housing as well as to
public schools.8 6 School desegregation has remained the more
widely publicized issue, and through the 1970s some Supreme
Court justices continued to insist that the government was not
directly responsible for residential segregation.3 7 Despite the
fundamental link between the two forms of segregation, some
federal courts have excluded evidence concerning residential
segregation when offered by plaintiffs as a means of proving in-
tentional school segregation. 8
Although school desegregation and public housing discrimina-
tion cases contain many similarities, there is a fundamental dif-
ference in the availability of effective remedies. In school suits,
courts have generally authorized or overseen busing programs
that, once initiated, may indefinitely carry out the desired public
policy. 9 There is no parallel remedy in the field of public hous-
ing. Sites, particularly in scattered-site programs, must be cho-
sen on a constant rather than a one-time basis. Scattered-site
housing requires a continuing commitment to its implementa-
tion. This requirement creates considerable difficulties for mem-
bers of the judiciary: judges cannot indefinitely oversee and con-
32. See Comment, The Public Housing Administration and Discrimination in Fed-
erally Assisted Low-Rent Housing, 64 MICH. L. REV. 871, 875 n.30 (1966) (authored by
Jordan D. Luttrell) (citing Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Denard v.
Housing Auth., 203 Ark. 1050, 159 S.W.2d 764 (1942); Housing Auth. v. Higginbotham,
143 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)).
33. Id. at 876 n.33 (citing Vann v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 113 F. Supp. 210 (N.D.
Ohio 1953); Banks v. Housing Auth., 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (Dist. Ct. App.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954)).
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
36. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
37. See Days, Book Review, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: Why Isn't Any-
body Laughing? 95 YALE L.J. 1737, 1760-61 (1986) (" '[Elconomic pressures and volun-
tary preferences are the primary determinants of residential patterns.'") (quoting Austin
Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 994 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted)). Id. ("[Riesidential segregation was a 'melange of past happenings
prompted by economic considerations, private discrimination, discriminatory school as-
signments, or a desire to reside near people of one's own race or ethnic background.' ")
(quoting Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 512 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
38. Id. at 1743.
39. See P. DiMONI, supra note 5, at 84-87, 160-64, 255-57, 332-34 (describing court-
ordered busing plans in Detroit, Dayton, Columbus, and Wilmington).
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trol the programs of local housing authorities. Eventually the
presiding judge must return full control to the appropriate au-
thorities and insist that they continue to develop public housing
projects in a nondiscriminatory manner.
In many public housing discrimination suits, the plaintiffs
have sought only a specific remedy to obtain short-term relief."0
In other cases, however, the judiciary has had to grapple with
the problem of ordering long-term remedies to address past de-
cades of purposeful segregation.4" Rarely, though, have the
courts ordered remedies that direct residential integration in
both the immediate and distant future.
A. Short-Term Remedies: Near-Sighted Solutions
Short-term remedies in public housing discrimination cases
have often succeeded. Such remedies have consisted of prevent-
ing the construction of specific projects in minority neighbor-
hoods or ensuring the building of a particular public housing
complex in a nonminority area. For example, in Bogalusa, Loui-
siana, a federal court in 1969 issued a preliminary injunction
against the local housing authority and a construction company
to prevent construction of a public housing development in an
all-black neighborhood.' The same year, property owners in the
only middle income black community in Tucson, Arizona, filed
suit to enjoin the placement of public housing in their neighbor-
hood.43 In both of these suits, the plaintiffs argued that the local
housing authority had chosen the disputed sites because of their
location in black neighborhoods. 4' Regrettably, both suits re-
sulted in no new public housing units being built in either black
or white neighborhoods.
In other cases, judges have ordered local governing bodies to
issue building permits and to desist from otherwise interfering
with the construction of public housing projects in white neigh-
borhoods. 45 In 1970, for instance, a federal judge ordered the city
of Lackawanna, New York, to take whatever steps necessary to
40. See infra Part II.A.
41. See infra Part II.B.
42. Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
43. El Cortez Heights Residents & Property Owners Ass'n v. Tucson Hous. Auth., 10
Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 294 (1969).
44. Hicks, 302 F. Supp at 620; El Cortez, 10 Ariz. App. at 133, 457 P.2d at 295.
45. Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296
F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
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allow construction to begin on a proposed public housing devel-
opment in a primarily white neighborhood."' It is rare, though,
that such housing developments are proposed, and even more
rare that they are actually constructed. Furthermore, despite
modest successes in imposing short-term remedies, judges have
been unable to achieve any long-term solutions to the obvious
opposition to integrated housing.
B. Long-Term Remedies: Two Case Studies
Judges who have ordered local governments to set forth long-
term public housing plans have faced stiff resistance. The con-
duct of officials in Chicago and Yonkers exemplifies this con-
certed opposition to integration.47 Federal judges found both cit-
ies guilty of intentional residential segregation; 48 however,
litigation continued for years as local officials frustrated the
plaintiffs and judges' efforts to implement integration programs.
The long and turbulent histories of these cases reveal the vast
array of remedies available to judges and suggest which methods
are most successful in implementing orders to integrate.
1. Chicago- Dorothy Gautreaux, along with more than
43,000 other black tenants in and applicants for public housing
in Chicago, filed suit against the Chicago Housing Authority
(CHA) and HUD in 1966. The plaintiffs alleged that both the
federal and local government housing agencies had illegally dis-
criminated against blacks by intentionally segregating them in
the administration of lower income public housing projects.49
The plaintiffs offered evidence that the site-selection and ten-
ant-selection procedures used in Chicago contained purposefully
segregative features that placed public housing almost entirely
in black neighborhoods and excluded black tenants from the few
projects in white neighborhoods."
46. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669, 697
(W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970).
47. Other cities, such as Detroit, Boston, and Dallas are facing or have already faced
similar public housing discrimination suits. Detroit Hous. Comm'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180
(6th Cir. 1955); N.Y. Times, June 28, 1989, at Al, col. 4; Herbers, Breakup of Housing
for Poor Is Backed in Integration Move, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1987, at Al, col. 5.
48. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Gau-
treaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
49. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. at 908; P. DIMOND, supra
note 5, at 205-08.
50. See P. DIMOND, supra note 5, at 205-08.
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Federal District Judge Richard B. Austin ruled on February
10, 1969, that the plaintiffs had satisfied their burden of proof
against CHA.5 1 Judge Austin urged the city to rectify the situa-
tion quickly: "[E]xisting patterns of racial separation must be
reversed if there is to be a chance of averting the desperately
intensifying division of Whites and Negroes in Chicago." 52 The
judge noted that the President's Commission on Civil Disorders
had estimated that Chicago would be fifty percent black by 1984
and that "[b]y 1984 it may be too late to heal racial divisions."53
Currently, more than five years after 1984, Chicago remains
one of the most segregated cities in the nation despite ongoing
litigation in the Gautreaux dispute.54 Since 1969, the Gautreaux
plaintiffs have returned to court more than twenty times,55 not
including separate attorneys' fees litigation. 6 Federal district
courts, courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court of the United
States have adopted a large number of different remedies
designed to begin the program of integration in Chicago's public
housing projects; yet the effectiveness of these remedies has
51. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. at 914.
52. Id: at 915.
53. Id.
54. See N.Y. Times, April 6, 1990, at A9, col. 1.
55. Cases directed primarily at CHA and the city include, in chronological order:
Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Gautreaux v. Chi-
cago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth.,
304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 436 F.2d 306 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 342 F.
Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd sub noma. Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210
(7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 (1974); Gautreaux v. Chicago.Hous. Auth.,
384 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1974), mandamus denied sub nom. Chicago Hous. Auth. v.
Austin, 511 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1975); Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 498 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill.
1980); Gautreaux v. Pierce, Nos. 66-C-1459, 66-C-1460, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6269,
1987 WL 13590 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 1987).
Cases aimed primarily at HUD include, in chronological order: Gautreaux v. Romney,
448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971); Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. 111. 1971),
rev'd, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972); Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ill.
1973), rev'd sub nom. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974),
aff'd sub noma. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F.
Supp. 665 (N.D. Ill. 1981), afl'd sub nom. Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616 (7th Cir.
1982); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 524 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 535 F.
Supp. 423 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 690 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 538 F.
Supp 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 538 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. IlM. 1982); Gau-
treaux v. Pierce, 548 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. IM. 1982); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 548 F. Supp.
1294 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 548 F. Supp. 1298 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 707
F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1983); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 101 F.R.D. 704 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 743
F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1984).
56. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 523 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd,
690 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1982); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 610 F. Supp. 29 (N.D.
Ill. 1985).
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been extremely limited .5 Only in the last few years has judicial
action succeeded in increasing the availability of integrated pub-
lic housing. 8
The Gautreaux litigation produced separate remedies against
CHA and HUD, and the eventual success of these remedies re-
flected the defendants' gradual willingness to comply. In the suit
against HUD, the plaintiffs charged the federal agency with vio-
lating the fifth amendment by supporting the discriminatory
practices of CHA. The district court dismissed the complaint in
1970; however, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that HUD had violated both the due process clause of
the fifth amendment and section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 by funding CHA's segregative housing policies. 9 Relying
on the decision of the court of appeals, the district court en-
joined the transfer of twenty-six million dollars from HUD to
CHA as part of the Model Cities Program. 0 Judge Austin, in
issuing the injunction, blamed the city for the negative impact
that the loss of funds would have upon the citizens of Chicago:
"Four thousand would lose their jobs and many other thousands
would be deprived of the benefits derived from the Model Cities
Program. Only the City of Chicago, by failing to comply with its
undertakings, and neither the plaintiffs nor this court, would be
responsible for such a catastrophe."'I On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit once again reversed the lower court.6 2 The appellate
court ruled that although the city did fail to comply with the
1969 judgment order, an insufficient nexus existed between the
CHA housing program and HUD's Model Cities Program to per-
mit the enjoining of the transfer of Model Cities funds to
Chicago 3
The September 1973 final judgment order issued against HUD
by the district court required the department to use its "best
efforts" in cooperating with the local housing authority and in
creating integrated public housing. 4 The plaintiffs had sought to
have the court issue an order that would require HUD to imple-
57. See infra text accompanying notes 85-86.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 90-91.
59. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 740 (7th Cir. 1971).
60. Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366, 370 (N.D. Ill. 1971). The Model Cities
Program allowed HUD "to grant funds for the purpose of enabling cities to undertake
various programs for the benefit of low and moderate income people." Gautreaux v.
Romney, 457 F.2d 124, 126 (7th Cir. 1972).
61. Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. at 370.
62. Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124, 129 (7th Cir. 1972).
63. Id. at 126-28.
64. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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ment integrated housing in the Chicago suburbs as well as in the
city. However, Judge Austin ruled that a federal court could not
order this type of metropolitan-wide relief when the plaintiffs
had proven constitutional violations only within the city limits.6 5
The court of appeals reversed this part of the lower court's deci-
sion,"6 and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in Hills v. Gau-
treaux,67 holding that the district court had the authority to or-
der HUD to institute remedies beyond the city's boundaries
because the agency had violated the Constitution and federal
laws. 8
After HUD lost the case before the Supreme Court, the De-
partment agreed to a demonstration program that provided two
to three hundred units each year to Gautreaux families. HUD
decided to use a housing assistance payment program to provide
relief to members of the Gautreaux class. From 1976 to mid-
1986, nearly 3,000 families (approximately 10,000 persons) bene-
fited from new housing opportunities due to the consent de-
cree. 9 Thus, HUD eventually accepted its duty to integrate pub-
lic housing and succeeded in implementing a program that
increased the number of available integrated housing units.
The Chicago City Council and CHA proved less willing to
comply with the courts' orders. A few months after he found
CHA guilty of intentional discrimination, Judge Austin issued a
supplemental judgment order that allowed the housing authority
to complete the "proposed projects in black areas that had trig-
gered the lawsuit, but ordered that three-fourths of future fam-
ily units would have to be built in white areas."7 The judge also
required that the next 700 units be built in "white areas" to mir-
ror those already approved for minority neighborhoods. 71 Fur-
thermore, the judgment order prohibited CHA from construct-
ing any projects with more than 120 dwelling units, taller than
three stories, or in areas already containing more than fifteen
65. Id.
66. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 939 (7th Cir. 1974).
67. 425 U.S. 284, 305-06 (1976).
68. The Court's ruling also distinguished Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), a
Detroit school-desegregation case in which the Court refused to permit a busing plan
that extended beyond the city limits into suburban school districts. Hills v. Gautreaux,
425 U.S. at 297-99.
69. Speech by Alexander Polikoff, Executive Director, Business and Professional
People for the Public Interest (BPI), The Law as an Instrument of Social
Change?-Twenty Years of Gautreaux (May 1, 1986), at The Palmer House, Chicago,
Illinois (on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
70. P. DIMOND, supra note 5, at 208.
71. Id. at 209.
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percent CHA residents. 7' Finally, the court directed CHA to
" 'use its best efforts to increase the supply of dwelling units as
rapidly as possible' in conformity with the 'scatter,' low-rise,
low-density objectives of the decree.""
For a year after the court's order, CHA did not propose any
new public housing sites to the city council.74 After a number of
conferences, the plaintiffs obtained from Judge Austin an order
that required CHA to submit proposed sites to the council ac-
cording to a specific timetable. Yet CHA stalled for another year
by appealing the order to the court of appeals and to the Su-
preme Court.75
CHA finally submitted proposed sites for at least 1500 units to
the Chicago City Council and the Chicago Plan Commission, a
city agency, on March 5, 1971.7" By July 1, the council and the
planning commission had approved the acquisition of enough
sites to provide fewer than 200 dwelling units that conformed
with the court's 1969 judgment order. 77 No other sites were ap-
proved by February 2, 1972, when plaintiffs once again brought
the case to court. The district court held that the city's failure to
approve at least 200 sites violated plaintiffs' rights under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment..7  Hence,
the district court held that the law requiring city council ap-
proval of public housing sites would no longer apply to CHA's
actions. 79 Furthermore, Judge Austin set forth a strict timetable
for CHA that required the agency to begin construction as soon
as possible, including construction on sites not formally ap-
proved by the city council.8"
In an effort to force implementation of intra-city relief, the
plaintiffs filed suit again in 1974, seeking to have a commissioner
appointed to take control of public housing programs in Chi-
cago.8 1 Judge Austin rejected such an approach. Instead, he ap-
pointed a federal magistrate to serve as a master in order to re-




75. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 922 (1971). See also P. DIMOND, supra note 5, at 209.
76. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 342 F. Supp. 827, 828 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
77. Id. at 829.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 830.
80. Id. at 830-31.
81. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 384 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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CHA's efforts to comply with court orders.2 In both 1980 and
1984, the plaintiff class attempted to have a receiver8" appointed
over the CHA, but the district court denied this relief.
8 4
After several more years of little progress in public housing
integration, the district court finally agreed to place CHA's scat-
tered-site program into receivership on May 14, 1987. 85 Federal
District Judge Marvin Aspen noted the court's frustration with
CHA's failure to abide by the many orders issued since 1969:
Enough is enough. It is fundamentally clear that in light
of CHA's track record, not only in CHA's present form
but also in its multitude of previous incarnations, this
case is well beyond the point where bureaucratic squab-
bles between local and federal agencies will be tolerated
as an excuse for noncompliance with the important reme-
dies sought by the plaintiffs, agreed to by the parties and
ordered by the Court."6
Thus, in the first five years after the court's initial remedy or-
der, CHA built no new housing in a city of three million peo-
ple. 7 The ensuing five years produced only 117 new units.8 Af-
ter 1979, CHA added a few hundred additional units. 9 On three
separate occasions, the plaintiffs sought to have the scattered-
site program placed into receivership so that interested parties
could administer it, but not until May 1987 did a federal judge
finally agree that the CHA should no longer retain control over
the program.
After being placed into receivership, Chicago's scattered-site
program made some limited progress toward integrating the
city's public housing units. Within one year, 15 buildings with 96
apartments had been renovated, were under construction, or
were awaiting HUD approval.90 By September 30, 1989, the re-
ceiver reported that rehabilitation was complete for 14 buildings
82. Id. at 37-38.
83. In such a case, a receiver would take over management of CHA, or of a particular
program normally administered by CHA officials.
84. Speech by Alexander Polikoff, supra note 69.
85. As noted in Gautreaux v. Pierce, Nos. 66-C-1459, 66-C-1460, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6269, 1987 WL 13590 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 1987).
86. Id.
87. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 384 F. Supp. 37, 38 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
88. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 498 F. Supp. 1072, 1074 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
89. Gautreaux v. Pierce, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6269, 1987 WL 13590.
90. First Anniversary Report of Receiver at 1. Gautreaux v. Pierce, Nos. 66-C-1459,
66-C-1460 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1988).
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with 72 apartments and that an additional 23 buildings with 147
units were under rehabilitation. 1
Although the HUD remedies placed several hundred tenants
into subsidized housing in the late 1970s, the CHA remedies did
not achieve any sort of compliance until the late 1980s. Even
after the court removed the obstacle of city council approval of
site proposals, CHA managed to delay development and con-
struction of public housing sites throughout the city. In addi-
tion, there was little coordination between HUD and CHA's ac-
tivities to comply with the courts' orders. Both agencies
demonstrated a desire to use appeals and bureaucratic devices to
contest any attempt by the federal courts to insist upon a non-
discriminatory policy for site and tenant selection.
2. Yonkers- The United States Department of Justice filed
a suit in 1980 against the city of Yonkers, New York, and its
board of education, alleging segregation in both its public
schools and public housing.2 Litigation in the case extended
into 1985, when the district court found the city liable for inten-
tional housing and school segregation.13 Federal District Judge
Leonard B. Sand criticized Yonkers for engaging in "a thirty-
year practice of consistently rejecting the integrative alternative
in favor of the segregative." 94 Following a six-day hearing to de-
bate appropriate remedies, Judge Sand issued a housing remedy
order on May 28, 1986.15
The order began by enjoining the city, its officials, and em-
ployees from impeding the integration of public housing.' In the
most far-reaching section of the opinion, the district court or-
dered the city to submit site proposals for 140 units of family
public housing within thirty days and site proposals for an addi-
tional 60 units within ninety days. 7 The order also required the
91. CHA Scattered Site Housing Program Status Report #11 at 2, Gautreaux v.
Pierce, Nos. 66-C-1459, 66-C-1460 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20 1989) (covering the period July 1,
1989 thru September 30, 1989). The receiver had also prepared sites for the construction
of several hundred new apartments; however, stringent HUD regulations limiting the
total development cost of subsidized units prevented any progress on new construction.
Id. at 1-3. Thus, once again, the federal agency frustrated implementation of the court's
orders.
92. Days, supra note 37, at 1764-65.
93. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
94. Id. at 1368.
95. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
96. Id.
97. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. at 1580-81.
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city to submit development proposals9" for the first 140 units
within ninety days of HUD's approval of the sites.9 9 Further-
more, the court insisted that within fifteen days Yonkers "exe-
cute a grant agreement with HUD for the 1984-85 program year,
with the condition that receipt of the grant depends on submis-
sion of acceptable sites for 140 units of family public hous-
ing."100 Each of these provisions of the housing remedy order
also contained a "devolution" clause allowing the plaintiff (Jus-
tice Department) and the plaintiff-intervenor (NAACP) to sub-
mit sites, proposals, or a grant agreement to the court for ap-
proval any time that the city failed to carry out its assigned task
within the allotted time period. 1
The housing remedy order also required the city of Yonkers to
set up an "Affordable Housing Trust Fund," using at least
twenty-five percent of certain funds it received from HUD.' °2
The district court ordered the city to use its "best efforts" to
secure additional funding for the trust, which would assist in fi-
nancing development of lower and moderate income housing by
private developers.'0 3 Finally, Judge Sand gave city officials six
months to submit a plan for the development of additional pub-
lic housing units in the predominantly white residential areas of
northwest or east Yonkers.'0 4
In 1987, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the housing remedy order along with the original liability rul-
ing.'01 The city, however, had already defaulted. Yonkers failed
to submit the proposed sites for 200 units before the thirty and
ninety-day deadlines. In addition, the city council did not agree
upon a plan for additional public housing units within the six-
month time period. Judge Sand set out to ensure that the city
complied with his housing remedy order. He appointed an
"outside housing advisor" in early 1987.106 He also ordered the
98. Pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 941.404 (1989). Development proposals contain a
description of the project, information about the site, and estimated construction costs.
Id.
99. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. at 1581. The court ordered
HUD to advise the city of HUD's approval or rejection of the site proposals within fif-
teen days of their submission. Id. at 1580-81.
100. Id. at 1580.
101. Id. at 1580-81.
102. Id. at 1581-82.
103. Id. at 1582.
104. Id.
105. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988).
106. See Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625, 637 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (reporting the history of the case).
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Yonkers Board of Education to return to the city certain vacant
portions of land so that the city could use the land for public
housing. ' In addition, the judge enjoined city officials from tak-
ing any further action in implementing private development
projects until it proceeded with its obligations to public
housing.' e8
The district court began 1988 by entering a consent judgment
to which both parties had agreed. '0 9 The consent judgment com-
mitted the city to build 200 units of public housing on seven
specific sites and "to implement a long-term plan to achieve the
goal of 800 units of subsidized housing that had been recom-
mended by the plaintiffs."' 10 Yet Yonkers attempted to disavow
the consent judgment and even "offered to return approximately
$30 million of federal funds in the event the Supreme Court
should set aside the public housing provisions of the Housing
Remedy Order."" In June, the district court entered a new
long-term order which the city council subsequently rejected."'
Finally, at the end of July 1988, Judge Sand demanded that
the city council either enact a specified legislative package de-
tailing the city's long-term housing plan or face contempt
charges and stiff fines. The fines against the city began at $100
per day and doubled in amount each day of continued noncom-
pliance. Furthermore, each council member voting against the
legislation would be fined $500 per day and imprisoned after ten
days of noncompliance. 1 3 Judge Sand excoriated the city council
for its refusal to comply with the lower court's order:
"[Th]ere does have to come a moment of truth, a mo-
ment of reckoning, a moment when the City of Yonkers
seeks not to become the national symbol of defiance to
civil rights and to heap shame upon shame upon itself,
but to recognize its obligation to conform to the laws of
the land and not step by step, order by order, but in the
way in which any responsible community concerned
about the welfare of its citizens functions. That is not go-
107. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 1407, 1412 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
108. Id. at 1415.
109. United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 448 (2d Cir. 1988).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 449.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 450 (describing district court's unpublished order).
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ing to be accomplished by this court adopting the
ordinance."11
When the city council failed to pass the legislative package on
August 1, the district court imposed the sanctions.115 The court
of appeals affirmed the order, although it set a ceiling for the
fines against the city at $1,000,000 per day." 6
Refusing to reconsider the sanctions against the city, the
United States Supreme Court agreed to stay the fines against
the individual council members in order to rule on the permissi-
bility of such an action.11 7 After thirteen days of fines against
the city, totalling $819,100, two council members changed their
votes and the housing resolution passed the city council."$ By
this time, the City of Yonkers had been forced to lay off more
than 400 employees, to limit sanitation services, and to close all
public libraries and parks.1 9
When the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of sanc-
tions against the individual council members in Spallone v.
United States,120 the five to four majority did not decide that
the fines were inevitably beyond the scope of a district judge's
authority. Instead, the Court's majority held that the district
court judge should have waited to determine if the fines against
the city would be sufficient to achieve compliance before levying
additional fines against the opposing council members. 21 In dis-
sent, Justice Brennan argued that the Court should defer to the
district court's more knowledgeable vantage point.'22 He also
noted that the added fines against the council members might
"secure compliance more promptly, minimizing the overall dis-
ruptive effect of the city sanctions on city services generally and
long-term compliance with the Consent Decree in particular." 2 3
Finally, Justice Brennan commented, "I hope such a message
[from the majority] will not daunt the courage of district courts
who, if ever again faced with such protracted defiance, must
114. Id. at 451 (quoting the lower court's statement at the August 2, 1988 contempt
hearing).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 460.
117. Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625, 631 (1990).
118. Feron, City Averts Bankruptcy and Cancels Layoffs-New Sites Sought, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 11, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
119. Spallone, 110 S. Ct. at 633.
120. Id. at 633-35.
121. Id. at 634-35.
122. Id. at 635 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 641 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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carefully yet firmly secure compliance with their remedial
orders."
124
As litigation concerning the opposing council members' sanc-
tions persisted, Yonkers made little progress towards achieving
the goals required by the district court. Not one new Ufnit of
public housing has been built." 5 In addition, Henry Spallone,
one of the leading council members opposed to integration, was
elected mayor of Yonkers in November 1989.126 Spallone's politi-
cal ascendancy and his claim of a public mandate has left Yon-
kers even further from reaching some sort of agreement with the
district court over its public housing policy. 27
III. GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REMEDIES
IN HOUSING DISCRIMINATION SUITS
The political reality of cases such as Yonkers and Gautreaux
is plain: no one wants public housing in his or her neighborhood.
Residents fear the three major concerns commonly associated
with public housing: crime, decreasing property values, and inte-
gration. Scattered-site public housing seeks to reduce these
fears, but white residents, who traditionally have controlled po-
litical mechanisms, still successfully avoid placing public housing
in their own neighborhoods. The few projects placed in white
areas purposefully admit only elderly or white tenants.
In public housing discrimination litigation, a judge possesses
considerable flexibility in fashioning an equitable remedy when
she exercises her authority to correct a constitutional viola-
tion. "'28 The judge's "task is to correct, by a balancing of the in-
dividual and collective interests, the condition that offends the
Constitution."' 29 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court insisted in
a voting rights case, "the court has not merely the power but the
duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate
124. Id. at 648 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. Feron, How Yonkers Has Held Off on Housing, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1990, at
D22, col. 4.
126. Id.
127. Id. (noting that Mayor Spallone has expressed interest in disputing the 1988
consent decree approved by Judge Sand).
128. Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (holding
that after a school board fails to offer suitable remedies, the district court has broad
power to design a remedy to implement integration).
129. Id. at 16.
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the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimi-
nation in the future.'
' 30
Despite its broad authority to implement remedies, the judici-
ary in these cases has struggled with the conflict between the
plaintiffs' right to integrated public housing and the defendant
local governments' right to limited interference with their legis-
lative and administrative duties. Unfortunately, the remedies
created by the courts have been astoundingly unsuccessful in se-
curing plaintiffs' rights. These remedies have permitted defend-
ant city governments and HUD to retain enough authority to
frustrate any real progress toward residential integration.
Some public housing discrimination suits such as Gautreaux
ironically have resulted in the complete cessation of subsidized
housing construction in any neighborhood. This result hits hard-
est those who are most in need "of any kind of shelter; it is there-
fore the result that judges should most carefully attempt to
avoid. When attempting to fashion remedies that achieve tangi-
ble results in public housing discrimination suits, courts should
follow several key principles. First, and most importantly, reme-
dies must immediately initiate some form of site selection and
construction or rehabilitation. The courts must prevent any de-
lays in the availability of new public housing units. Judges must
exercise great care to ensure that remedies do not result in a
decrease in the opening or availability of housing. Second, the
remedies must also implement long-range plans that establish
appropriate goals for the distribution of housing sites through-
out different neighborhoods, thereby effectuating residential
integration.
Finally, both the long-term and short-term plans should allow
local housing authorities as much input and control over scat-
tered-site programs as they are willing to provide. If the local
authorities propose reasonable sites according to a strict timeta-
ble established by the court, the judge should permit implemen-
tation of the plans. Any failure to meet set deadlines, however,
should result in an immediate transfer of authority back to the
courts or court-appointed officials. The judiciary cannot allow
local authorities, whose discriminatory policies first caused the
litigation, to continue to obstruct efforts to initiate scattered-site
housing programs and residential integration. Nevertheless, it is
important that local administrative bodies have the opportunity
to leave behind past wrongs by embarking on a, new path. The
machinery of government will function more efficiently if the ju-
i30. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
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diciary can rely on local officials to administer their own public
housing programs.
As the various court orders in public housing discrimination
cases demonstrate, judges have failed to focus adequately on
these three key principles necessary to appropriate relief for the
plaintiffs. As a result, courts have not instituted short-term and
long-term plans for public housing integration that adequately
benefit the plaintiff classes.
A. Deadlines for Site Proposals and Construction
One remedy, common to both the Gautreaux and Yonkers
suits, required the local authorities to propose and develop a
specified number of sites for public housing according to a time-
table. This "deadline" remedy permitted the local authorities to
select the particular sites, provided that a given percentage of
those sites were located in predominantly white areas. The ad-
vantage of this type of order is that it sets both short-term and
long-term goals for the city, and it avoids more punitive
measures.
The problem with the "deadline" remedy is that it has proven
unsuccessful. Both in Chicago and Yonkers, for instance, the cit-
ies defaulted on proposing the required number of sites by the
courts' deadlines. The remedy has failed because the courts al-
lowed local officials to retain too much authority for too long.
Most cities involved in public housing discrimination suits al-
ready have a long history of opposition to integrated housing; it
should not take an additional year, or several years, to realize
that city officials will not comply with already missed deadlines.
In all likelihood, local officials will not quickly change their be-
havior and abide by court-ordered deadlines if courts do not im-
pose additional sanctions.
A timetable establishing deadlines for site proposals and con-
struction is essential to court-ordered, scattered-site programs.
However, the judiciary must insist on adherence to the timeta-
ble, and a judge must strengthen a deadline order with sanctions
or alternative implementation plans that take effect immediately
if the city fails to abide by the original schedule. Thus, the im-
portant issue is what type of reinforcement for deadlines will en-
sure the progress of scattered-site programs.
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B. Bypassing the City Council
The judges in Gautreaux and Yonkers took vastly different
approaches in their dealings with recalcitrant city councils. In
Gautreaux, the district court judge eventually bypassed the Chi-
cago City Council and approved public housing sites himself, de-
spite a state law requiring council approval of the sites. 31 This
decision facilitated the process of constructing public housing
units in white residential areas. Of course, Judge Austin did not
decide to use this remedy until the city's aldermen had given
him ample proof of their refusal to approve public housing sites
in nonminority areas. The bypass ruling came in 1972, three
years after the judge issued the first remedy in the Gautreaux
litigation.1 32 Appeals of the ruling delayed its implementation
for another two years.
Thus, beginning in 1974, CHA no longer needed approval
from the Chicago City Council for public housing sites. However,
CHA had a history of opposition to integrated housing similar to
that of the city council. The court failed to recognize that it had
surmounted only one of the two major obstacles to residential
integration. The local housing authority retained sufficient
power to frustrate efforts by the plaintiffs to obtain relief until
1987, when Judge Aspen ordered CHA's scattered-site program
into receivership. 3 3 It was only at that point, eighteen years af-
ter the original finding of discrimination in the case, that the
court relieved the culpable parties of control over public housing
sites and placed the scattered-site housing program into the
hands of private organizations.
Thus, bypassing the city council generally helps to achieve
short-term goals but is not particularly useful in long-term plan-
ning. It only removes authority from local legislators, allowing
housing officials to continue to frustrate integration programs if
they so choose. As such, this remedy cannot be expected to
achieve the desired compliance without more direct measures.
C. Fines
In Yonkers, the district court judge sought to force the city
council to accept publicly a plan for integrated public housing.
131. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 342 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. 111. 1972).
132. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Il1. 1969).
133. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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He declined to bypass the city council, insisting that "this Court
will stay its hand until it is conclusively established that no vol-
untary compliance will be forthcoming. ' 134 After Yonkers had
defaulted on three of the important deadlines established by the
housing remedy order, Judge Sand continued to resist contempt
sanctions and attempted to encourage voluntary compliance by
the city council.13 5 The city council proved quite stubborn and
agreed to the legislation only after the court imposed drastic
fines on the city.
Even after the Yonkers City Council finally passed the resolu-
tion accepting a plan for housing integration, the local authori-
ties had not yet proposed or accepted any sites or initiated con-
struction on any public housing units. Thus, the New York
judge's approach delayed even further the commencement of
construction while he battled with the city council over passage
of a resolution. This tactic aspired to promote long-term reme-
dies, but sacrificed the possibility of any short-term improve-
ments in the availability of public housing units.
Imposing substantial fines upon a city, as evident in Yonkers,
is a severe measure used to spark local authorities to act. Partic-
ularly when the city faces the necessity of laying off public em-
ployees, city council members realize that their votes are respon-
sible for the loss of patronage and support." 6 Yonkers faced
bankruptcy within a matter of weeks.1 - 7 Nevertheless, the possi-
bility remains that the fines will fail to move city officials or
public sentiment.
13 8
Furthermore, those who suffer the most from fines against the
city are without fault. These punitive measures adversely affect
those who rely the most upon city services and jobs. Lower in-
come citizens, including the plaintiffs in the litigation, are most
likely to feel the impact of a curtailment of city services and job
lay-offs. These people should not suffer for the recalcitrance of
city officials. Fining the city also reduces the resources available
134. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., No. 80-CIV-6761, 1986 WL 6159
(S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1986).
135. Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625, 635-38 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
136. Feron, supra note 118.
137. Id.
138. In Yonkers, a bumper sticker stating "Bankruptcy is better" became popular
during the city's financial crisis, which was brought about by the court's sanctions.
Fodevaro, Yonkers Race Is Viewed As Vote on Housing Plan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1989,
at B8, col. 2.
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to comply with the court's orders. 39 Furthermore, although fines
may result in immediate action, they often cause bitter resent-
ment as well, and thus jeopardize long-range interests of re-
turning full control to the local authorities. The courts need to
consider constructive, rather than punitive, measures to en-
courage city officials to support scattered-site housing programs.
Sanctions against individual city officials who are directly re-
sponsible for the lack of compliance with a court's order impose
punishment on those who are at fault and do not place any di-
rect costs on the city. 4 0 However, such fines may well make city
officials martyrs in the eyes of their constituents,'" and these
sanctions still do not ensure compliance with the court's orders.
Individual contempt citations may also instill resentment in the
punished officials towards the policies supported by the court.
Rather than wage a war against the recalcitrance of a small
group of city officials, the courts must first seek to grant the
plaintiffs the relief that they desire.
D. Masters and Outside Housing Advisors
The appointment of a master or outside housing advisor may
facilitate the proposal or approval of scattered-site public hous-
ing, but such an appointment is a means to an end rather than a
real solution to the problems facing the court. Appointments
may frustrate efforts to seek immediate relief because the ap-
pointed persons add another level of bureaucracy to the housing
process. Masters or advisors may take more time to produce re-
ports than expected or desired. The court may find an advisor
extremely useful in pondering the specifics of any housing plan;
however, the implementation process remains in the court's
power.
139. Spallone, 110 S. Ct. at 643 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 610 (D.R.I. 1980)).
140. The Supreme Court's narrow decision in Spallone did not rule out the permissi-
bility of such fines. Rather, the Court held that such fines could not be imposed concur-
rently with the fines against the city. 110 S. Ct. at 634-35.
141. McFadden, Final Days of Defiance for Yonkers: Council Had to Decide the
Fate of the City, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1988, at A15, col. 1.
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E. Receivership
Placing a city's scattered-site housing program into receiver-
ship may be a final effort by a court to relieve an obstinate local
body of its responsibilities. Such a measure is quite drastic, and
the court should consider it only if numerous other remedies
have failed. However, the judiciary need not wait twenty years
to decide that a local housing authority cannot be permitted to
carry on its efforts to frustrate court-ordered integration. One
disadvantage to a receiver is that the time it takes the receiver
to familiarize himself with the city's land holdings is much
greater than if the local housing authority retains its authority.
Of course, receivership cannot permanently replace the local
housing authority. At some point, the court will have to return a
city's housing program to the appropriate administrative agency,
preferably before the agency becomes too accustomed to func-
tioning without it.
F. Devolution Clause
Another possible form of relief in public housing discrimina-
tion suits allows the plaintiffs to submit their own proposals if
the city housing authority fails to meet the court's deadline. The
housing remedy order in Yonkers included provisions that re-
quired the plaintiffs to submit to the court a grant agreement,
site proposals, and development plans only after the city missed
the court-ordered deadline.142 The court also added a more
sweeping devolution clause, reserving the authority to appoint a
third party to prepare any materials required by the order.1 3
Although Yonkers defaulted on the deadlines, Judge Sand re-
frained from effectuating the alternative provisions, choosing in-
stead to force the city council to abide by the original plan.
Devolution clauses permit a court to set both short-term and
long-term housing goals. Furthermore, this remedy accords the
local authorities significant control over public housing if they
choose to accept it and meet minimum requirements. Finally,
the devolution provisions assure that the plaintiffs will obtain
relief because they can make their own proposals as soon as the
city fails to meet its obligations. If the plaintiffs are incapable of
142. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1577, 1580-81 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
143. Id. at 1581.
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preparing the proper documents and proposals, the court may
appoint a neutral third party, an expert in the field, to do the
work and receive compensation from the defendants. 44
IV. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSED ORDER FOR IMPLEMENTATION
When selecting remedies to eliminate illegal segregation in
public housing, the courts must seek to implement public policy
by promoting residential integration. Scattered-site housing pro-
grams can and do work. These programs are the key to eliminat-
ing discrimination in public housing. In addition, they help to
reduce the serious problems brought about by the concentration
of lower income housing. Therefore, the judiciary must be more
firm in requiring local housing authorities to initiate such pro-
grams rapidly. A commitment to scattered-site housing requires
remedies that focus upon both short-term plans and long-term
goals. Although judges must permit local authorities to rectify
past injustices in site selection, the judiciary cannot allow these
authorities to continue to deny the rights of citizens who seek
equal opportunities in obtaining subsidized public housing.
The structure for a model judicial order in public housing dis-
crimination suits emerges from the synthesis of those remedies
that closely adhere to the key principles discussed above.
Clearly, any standard order must have a deadline for site pro-
posals and the development of a specified number of subsidized
units within non-minority neighborhoods. This timetable must
insist upon both short-term plans and long-term goals for imple-
menting the court's order, and the judge must demand strict
compliance with the deadlines.
The standard order should also include a devolution clause
that permits the plaintiffs or a third party appointed by the
court to submit to the judge any required proposals or plans
that the defendants have failed to complete within the allotted
time period. Such clauses avoid time-consuming bickering and
bargaining between the court and the defendants, and they per-
mit the plaintiffs to take an active part in effectuating their own
desired relief. In addition, the standard order should propose
placing the scattered-site program into receivership if the plain-
tiffs can demonstrate at a later date (one year, not twenty years)
that the defendants have continually refused to agree upon ac-
ceptable long-term housing plans.
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An additional incentive for short-term compliance with the
court's order would be an injunction prohibiting the payment of
salaries to those officials directly responsible for the city's failure
to meet its obligations.1" For instance, if the local housing au-
thority officials refused to comply with a judge's request for a
certain number of proposed sites within thirty days, the judge
would enjoin the payment of salary to those officials for that
thirty-day period. Theoretically, this remedy is easier to accept
than the imposition of fines, although both remedies have a sim-
ilar effect. A salary injunction rests on the premise that if offi-
cials do not abide by their obligation to uphold the Constitution
and faithfully execute their duties, they should not receive com-
pensation. More practically, the city itself does not lose money;
rather, it retains part of its coffers because of the officials' irre-
sponsibility. In this manner, those who depend upon city ser-
vices do not suffer for the actions of public servants.
Through the use of these measures, courts may allow city offi-
cials to decide whether they will assume-or abdicate-their
constitutional responsibilities. Local authorities need to realize
that the integration of scattered-site public housing must and
will occur with or without their help. As the success of scattered-
site housing continues across the country, more local housing au-
thorities may begin to implement voluntarily these programs
aimed at achieving effective nondiscriminatory housing. How-
ever, judges must stand ready to insist upon compliance with
their orders in the face of resistance to constitutionally man-
dated integration.
145. A distinction might be drawn between fining city officials and temporarily with-
holding their salaries until they fulfill their legal obligations. The latter type of sanctions
do not appear to conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Spallone. See supra note
140 and accompanying text.
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